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FOREWORD FROM THE CHAIR
The international drug control regime is broken.  
In our 2011 report we called on global 
leaders to join an open conversation on drug 
policy reform. We recommended that they 
immediately discuss alternatives to the failed 
war on drugs. In subsequent reports we drew 
their attention to the urgent need for reform to 
reduce the devastating epidemics of HIV and 
Hepatitis C. We asked policy makers to break 
the fifty year taboo on talking about more 
effective and humane ways to manage drugs.
Today, three years later, we are pleased to see 
that a genuine debate on new approaches to 
drug policy is underway in an array of national 
and regional forums. Crucially, the discussion 
is based on evidence, and new, exciting 
innovations are spreading across the Americas, 
Africa, Europe, South and South East Asia, and 
Australia and the South Pacific. The discussion 
is truly global, and governments and civil 
societies are learning from one another, and 
testing out new approaches on the ground.
The reality in 2014 is that governments and 
civil societies are not just talking, many 
are taking action. Drug policy reform is 
moving from the realm of theory to practice. 
Courageous leaders from across the spectrum 
are seeing the many political, social and 
economic dividends from drug policy reform. 
They recognize the critical mass of voices 
demanding a new course. And recognizing that 
change is inevitable, they are beginning to 
experiment with a range of solutions drawing 
from solid data and with an open mind. 
Informed approaches are trumping ideological 
ones and the results are encouraging.
In this report, we set out a broad roadmap 
for getting drugs under control. We recognize 
that past approaches premised on a punitive 
law enforcement paradigm have failed, 
emphatically so. They have resulted in more 
violence, larger prison populations, and the 
erosion of governance around the world. The 
health harms associated with drug use have 
got worse, not better. The Global Commission 
on Drug Policy instead advocates for an 
approach to drug policy that puts public 
health, community safety, human rights, and 
development at the center.
We need to be bold but pragmatic. There is no 
one-size-fits-all pathway to enacting drug policy 
reform. We recognize that the shift will demand 
changes in domestic and international policy 
and practice. It will entail trial and error and an 
honest and critical engagement with results. 
But we are encouraged by the signposts that 
are emerging that can help governments and 
citizens take the right steps forward. They 
have momentum on their side, and can gather 
insights from the many positive developments 
around the world that have occurred since 
2011.
What is now needed is action by the world’s 
multilateral institutions, first of all the United 
Nations (UN). We are delighted to see the 
quality of high level debate being generated 
from heads of state and senior UN figures. 
It is also encouraging to see important 
regional organizations contributing to positive 
reform. Reports supporting change from the 
Organization of American States, the West 
Africa Commission on Drugs, and the Global 
Commission on HIV and the Law, are all critical 
building blocks of drug policies that work. They 
are also openly challenging the international 
drug control regime and creating political 
space for new players to explore similar 
approaches.
We are driven by a sense of urgency. There  
is a widespread acknowledgment that the 
current system is not working, but also 
recognition that change is both necessary  
and achievable. We are convinced that the 
2016 United Nations General Assembly Special
Session on drugs (UNGASS) is an historic 
opportunity to discuss the shortcomings of 
the drug control regime, identify workable 
alternatives and align the debate with ongoing 
debates on the post-2015 development agenda 
and human rights. The Global Commission 
encourages all UN member states and 
agencies to continue rethinking the question 
of drug policy reform. We encourage leaders to 
seriously engage with new challenges, not least 
new synthetic drugs appearing on the market 
almost daily, which demand more creative 
responses.
A stale political declaration in 2016 that 
promises to ‘solve the drugs problem’ and 
make the world ‘drug-free’ is not going to be 
the answer the world needs. We reiterate that 
the international community needs to come 
to terms with the reality that easy answers to 
solve the drug problem do not exist. 
Our report does not offer the definitive solution. 
Rather, it provides a roadmap for pragmatic 
policy change we think will make the drug-
related problems the world faces today much 
more manageable. We ask that countries 
take advantage of the 2016 UNGASS as an 
opportunity to finally start getting drugs under 
control.
Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
Former President of Brazil (1994-2002)
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ExECUTIvE SUMMARY
The upcoming United Nations General Assembly 
Special Session on the World Drug Problem 
(UNGASS) in 2016 is an unprecedented 
opportunity to review and re-direct national drug 
control policies and the future of the global drug 
control regime. As diplomats sit down to rethink 
international and domestic drug policy, they 
would do well to recall the mandate of the United 
Nations, not least to ensure security, human rights 
and development. Health is the thread that runs 
through all three of these aspirations, and the 
UN global drug control regime has the ‘health 
and welfare of mankind’ as its ultimate goal. But 
overwhelming evidence points to not just the 
failure of the regime to attain its stated goals but 
also the horrific unintended consequences  
of punitive and prohibitionist laws and policies.
A new and improved global drug control regime is 
needed that better protects the health and safety 
of individuals and communities around the world. 
Harsh measures grounded in repressive ideologies 
must be replaced by more humane and effective 
policies shaped by scientific evidence, public 
health principles and human rights standards. 
This is the only way to simultaneously reduce 
drug-related death, disease and suffering and 
the violence, crime, corruption and illicit markets 
associated with ineffective prohibitionist policies. 
The fiscal implications of the policies we advocate, 
it must be stressed, pale in comparison to the 
direct costs and indirect consequences generated 
by the current regime.
The Global Commission proposes five pathways 
to improve the global drug policy regime. After 
putting people´s health and safety at the 
center of the picture, governments are urged 
to ensure access to essential medicines and 
pain control. The Commissioners call for an 
end to the criminalization and incarceration 
of users together with targeted prevention, 
harm reduction and treatment strategies for 
dependent users. In order to reduce drug related 
harms and undermine the power and profits of 
organized crime, the Commission recommends 
that governments regulate drug markets and 
adapt their enforcement strategies to target 
the most violent and disruptive criminal groups 
rather than punish low level players. The Global 
Commission’s proposals are complementary 
and comprehensive. They call on governments to 
rethink the problem, do what can and should be 
done immediately, and not to shy away from the 
transformative potential of responsible regulation.
The obstacles to drug policy reform are both 
daunting and diverse. Powerful and established 
drug control bureaucracies, both national and 
international, staunchly defend status quo 
policies. They seldom question whether their 
involvement and tactics in enforcing drug policy 
are doing more harm than good. Meanwhile, 
there is often a tendency to sensationalize each 
new “drug scare” in the media. And politicians 
regularly subscribe to the appealing rhetoric of 
“zero tolerance” and creating “drug free” societies 
rather than pursuing an informed approach based 
on evidence of what works. Popular associations 
of illicit drugs with ethnic and racial minorities stir 
fear and inspire harsh legislation. And enlightened 
reform advocates are routinely attacked as “soft 
on crime” or even “pro-drug.” 
The good news is that change is in the air. The 
Global Commission is gratified that a growing 
number of the recommendations offered in this 
report are already under consideration, underway 
or firmly in place around the world. But we are at 
the beginning of the journey and governments can 
benefit from the accumulating experience where 
reforms are being pursued. Fortunately, the dated 
rhetoric and unrealistic goals set during the 1998 
UNGASS on drugs are unlikely to be repeated 
in 2016. Indeed, there is growing support for 
more flexible interpretations and reform of the 
international drug control conventions aligned 
with human rights and harm reduction principles. 
All of these developments bode well for the 
reforms we propose below.
Putting health and community 
safety first requires a fundamental 
reorientation of policy priorities 
and resources, from failed punitive 
enforcement to proven health and 
social interventions. 
Both the stated goals of drug control policies, 
and the criteria by which such policies are 
assessed, merit reform. Traditional goals 
and measures – such as hectares of illicit 
crops eradicated, amounts of drugs seized, 
and number of people arrested, prosecuted, 
convicted and incarcerated for drug law 
violations – have failed to produce positive 
outcomes. Far more important are goals and 
measures that focus on reducing both drug-
related harms such as fatal overdoses, HIV/
AIDS, hepatitis and other diseases as well 
as prohibition-related harms such as crime, 
violence, corruption, human rights violations, 
environmental degradation, displacement 
of communities, and the power of criminal 
organizations. Spending on counterproductive 
enforcement measures should be ended, 
while proven prevention, harm reduction and 
treatment measures are scaled up to meet 
need.  
Ensure equitable access to essential 
medicines, in particular opiate-based 
medications for pain.
More than eighty per cent of the world´s 
population carries a huge burden of avoidable 
pain and suffering with little or no access to 
such medications. This state of affairs persists 
despite the fact that the avoidance of ill 
health and access to essential medicines  is 
a key objective and obligation of the global 
drug control regime. Governments need to 
establish clear plans and timelines to remove 
the domestic and international obstacles 
to such provision. They also should allocate 
the necessary funding for an international 
program – to be overseen by the World 
Health Organization (WHO) and developed in 
partnership with the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International 
Narcotics Control Board (INCB) – to ensure 
equitable and affordable access to these 
medicines where they are unavailable.
OUR RECOMMENDATIONS CAN BE 
SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:
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ExECUTIvE SUMMARY
Stop criminalizing people for drug use 
and possession – and stop imposing 
“compulsory treatment” on people 
whose only offense is drug use or 
possession. 
Criminalization of drug use and possession 
has little to no impact on levels of drug 
use in an open society. Such policies do, 
however, encourage high risk behaviours 
such as unsafe injecting, deter people in 
need of drug treatment from seeking it, divert 
law enforcement resources from focusing 
on serious criminality, reduce personal and 
government funds that might otherwise be 
available for positive investment in people’s 
lives, and burden millions with the long-
lasting negative consequences of a criminal 
conviction. Using the criminal justice system 
to force people arrested for drug possession 
into ‘treatment’ often does more harm than 
good. Far better is ensuring the availability of 
diverse supportive services in communities. This 
recommendation, it should be noted, requires 
no reform of international drug control treaties.
Rely on alternatives to incarceration 
for non-violent, low-level participants 
in illicit drug markets such as farmers, 
couriers and others involved in the 
production, transport and sale of illicit 
drugs.
Governments devote ever increasing resources 
to detecting, arresting and incarcerating 
people involved in illicit drug markets – with 
little or no evidence that such efforts reduce 
drug-related problems or deter others from 
engaging in similar activities. Community-
based and other non-criminal sanctions 
routinely prove far less expensive, and more 
effective than criminalization and incarceration. 
Subsistence farmers and day laborers involved 
in harvesting, processing, transporting 
or trading and who have taken refuge in 
the illicit economy purely for reasons of 
survival should not be subjected to criminal 
punishment. Only longer-term socioeconomic 
development efforts that improve access to 
land and jobs, reduce economic inequality and 
social marginalization, and enhance security 
can offer them a legitimate exit strategy.
Focus on reducing the power of 
criminal organizations as well as the 
violence and insecurity that result 
from their competition with both one 
another and the state. 
Governments need to be far more strategic, 
anticipating the ways in which particular law 
enforcement initiatives, particularly militarized 
‘crackdowns’, may exacerbate criminal violence 
and public insecurity without actually deterring 
drug production, trafficking or consumption. 
Displacing illicit drug production from one 
locale to another, or control of a trafficking 
route from one criminal organization to another, 
often does more harm than good. The goals of 
supply-side enforcement need to be reoriented 
Allow and encourage diverse 
experiments in legally regulating 
markets in currently illicit drugs, 
beginning with but not limited to 
cannabis, coca leaf and certain  
novel psychoactive substances.
Much can be learned from successes and 
failures in regulating alcohol, tobacco, 
pharmaceutical drugs and other products and 
activities that pose health and other risks to 
individuals and societies. New experiments 
are needed in allowing legal but restricted 
access to drugs that are now only available 
illegally. This should include the expansion of 
heroin-assisted treatment for some long-term 
dependent users, which has proven so effective 
in Europe and Canada. Ultimately the most 
effective way to reduce the extensive harms of 
the global drug prohibition regime and advance 
the goals of public health and safety is to get 
drugs under control through responsible legal 
regulation.
Take advantage of the opportunity 
presented by the upcoming UNGASS in 
2016 to reform the global drug policy 
regime. 
The leadership of the UN Secretary-General 
is essential to ensure that all relevant UN 
agencies – not just those focused on law 
enforcement but also health, security, human 
rights and development – engage fully in a 
‘One-UN’ assessment of global drug control 
strategies. The UN Secretariat should urgently 
facilitate open discussion including new ideas 
and recommendations that are grounded in 
scientific evidence, public health principles, 
human rights and development. Policy shifts 
towards harm reduction, ending criminalization 
of people who use drugs, proportionality of 
sentences and alternatives to incarceration 
have been successfully defended over the past 
decades by a growing number of countries on 
the basis of the legal latitude allowed under 
the UN treaties. Further exploration of flexible 
interpretations of the drug treaties is an 
important objective, but ultimately the global 
drug control regime must be reformed to permit 
responsible legal regulation.  
from unachievable market eradication to 
achievable reductions in violence and disruption 
linked to the trafficking. Enforcement resources 
should be directed towards the most disruptive, 
problematic and violent elements of the 
trade – alongside international cooperation 
to crack-down on corruption and money 
laundering.  Militarizing anti-drug efforts is 
seldom effective and often counterproductive. 
Greater accountability for human rights abuses 
committed in pursuit of drug law enforcement is 
essential.
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1. 
THE ‘WAR ON DRUGS’ 
HAS FAILED 
– NEW APPROACHES 
ARE EMERGING
Global drug prohibition has not only failed to achieve its 
original stated objectives, it has also generated alarming social 
and health problems. Alternative policies are emerging aimed 
at safeguarding the health and safety of communities, 
and strengthening security, human rights, and development.
The international drug control regime has two basic objectives.1 
The first is to ensure access to drugs for scientific and medical 
purposes. The second is to prohibit access to certain drugs for 
other uses. Notwithstanding an overarching goal to protect the 
‘health and welfare of mankind,’ the regime, and policies adopted 
to support it since the 1960s, is premised on the criminalization of 
people who produce, sell or use drugs.
After more than half a century of this punitive approach, there is 
now overwhelming evidence that it has not only failed to achieve its 
own objectives, but has also generated serious social and health 
problems. If governments are genuinely committed to safeguarding 
the safety, health, and human rights of their citizens, they must 
urgently adopt new approaches. A number of national and local 
governments are already taking courageous steps in this direction. 
The design of effective drug policy demands a clear reading of the 
issue. It requires making tight distinctions between the problems 
arising from drug use, such as dependence or overdose, and the 
problems generated by enforcement-led drug policies, such as 
the crime and violence associated with the illicit trade. Yet there 
is an unhelpful tendency by some governments to conflate the 
harms arising from drug consumption and the harms generated by 
repressive drug policy. 
As a result, many policy makers talk in generalized terms of the 
‘world drug problem’ 2  or the ‘drug menace’. This threat-based 
narrative is routinely deployed by proponents of prohibition to justify 
the continuation, and in some cases intensification, of criminal 
justice measures that have fuelled many of the drug related harms 
to begin with. And in some parts of the world, this heavy handed 
approach burnishes their ‘tough on crime’ credentials. 
In reality, the use of drugs encompasses a wide spectrum 
of behaviors. These range from the non-problematic to the 
compulsive and profoundly harmful. According to the UNODC, 
10 per cent of people who use drugs globally are considered to 
be ‘problem users’.3 This suggests that the significant majority of 
drug consumption is essentially non-problematic. Yet global drug 
policy continues to treat all drug use as if it constitutes a grave 
threat to society. Drug policy remains narrowly framed in terms of 
‘combating’ the ‘evil’ of drug addiction.4,5
It is from this initial, flawed, generalization of all drug use as an 
‘evil’ to be tackled with repressive criminal justice-based measures, 
that so many irrational and ineffective policy responses have 
flowed, and so many dysfunctional institutions emerged. These easy 
simplifications contribute to political decisions that are divorced 
from basic scientific, public health, and human rights norms. At the 
heart of the Global Commission’s recommendations, then, is a call 
for realigning global drug policy with these basic standards.
Until recently, decision makers have found it difficult to challenge 
the status quo. Advocacy for alternative policies is often portrayed 
as ‘surrendering’, as being ‘soft on drugs’, or even ‘pro-drugs’. 
Fortunately, the drug policy debate is beginning to move beyond 
such misconceptions and simple generalizations. The Global 
Commission’s call for reform underlines the importance of drug 
policy principles that actively protect – rather than undermine – 
the health and welfare of individuals and societies. There is no 
contradiction in being both ‘anti-drug’ and ‘pro-reform’. 
La
lo
 A
lm
ei
da
1312
COUNTING THE COSTS OF OvER HALF 
A CENTURY OF THE ‘WAR ON DRUGS’ 
A FAILURE ON ITS OWN TERMS FUELING CRIME AND ENRICHING CRIMINALS
UNDERMINING DEvELOPMENT AND SECURITY, FUELING CONFLICT
WASTING BILLIONS, UNDERMINING ECONOMIES
THREATENING PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY
UNDERMINING HUMAN RIGHTS, FOSTERING DISCRIMINATION
The international community is further away than ever 
from realizing a ‘drug-free world’. Global drug production, 
supply and use continue to rise despite increasing 
resources being directed towards enforcement. 
• The UNODC’s ‘best estimate’ for the number of users  
worldwide (past year use) rose from 203 million in 2008, to 
243 million in 2012 – an 18 per cent increase, or a rise in  
prevalence of use from 4.6 per cent to 5.2 per cent in  
four years.6,7 
• Global illicit opium production increased by more than 
380 per cent since 1980, rising from 1,000 metric tons to 
over 4,000 today.8 Meanwhile, heroin prices in Europe fell by 
75 per cent since 1990 and by 80 per cent in the US since 
1980, even as purity has risen.9 
• The international drug control system is, by its own admis-
sion, ‘floundering’ in the face of the proliferation of novel 
psychoactive substances (NPS).10  In 2013, the number of 
NPS exceeded the number of drugs prohibited under the 
international drug control framework.
Rather than reduce crime, enforcement-based drug policy 
actively fuels it. Spiraling illicit drug prices provide a 
profit motive for criminal groups to enter the trade, and 
drive some people who are dependent on drugs to commit 
crime in order to fund their use.
• Drug prohibition has fuelled a global illegal trade 
estimated by the UNODC to be in the hundreds of billions. 
According to 2005 data, production was valued at $13 
billion, the wholesale industry priced at $94 billion and retail 
estimated to be worth $332 billion.27  The wholesale valuation 
for the drugs market is higher than the global equivalent for 
cereals, wine, beer, coffee, and tobacco combined.28
• Illicit, unregulated drug markets are inherently violent. 
Paradoxically, successful interdiction efforts and arrests of 
drug cartel leaders and traffickers routinely create power 
vacuums. These in turn can spur renewed violence as the 
remaining players compete to gain market share.29
• The trafficking in illicit drugs can strengthen armed 
groups operating outside the rule of law. For example, the 
opium trade earns paramilitary groups operating along the 
Pakistan-Afghanistan border up to $500 million a year.30 
Criminal drug producers and traffickers thrive in fragile, 
conflict-affected and underdeveloped regions, where vul-
nerable populations are easily exploited. The corruption, 
violence, and instability generated by unregulated drug 
markets are widely recognized as a threat to both security 
and development. 
• Estimates of deaths from violence related to the illegal 
drug trade in Mexico since the war on drugs was scaled-up 
in 2006 range from 60,000 to more than 100,000.31 
• Illegal drug profits fuel regional instability by helping to 
arm insurgent, paramilitary and terrorist groups.32 The redi-
rection of domestic and foreign investment away from social 
and economic priorities toward military and policing sectors 
has a damaging effect on development. 
• In Colombia, approximately 2.6 million acres of land were 
aerially sprayed with toxic chemicals as part of drug crop 
eradication efforts between 2000 and 2007. Despite their 
destructive impact on livelihoods and land, the number of 
locations used for illicit coca cultivation actually increased 
during this period.33
Tens of billions are spent on drug law enforcement every 
year.34 And while good for the defense industry, there are 
disastrous secondary costs, both financial and social.
• The emphasis on counterproductive law enforcement 
strategies to tackle drugs generates ‘policy displacement’. In 
other words, it distracts attention and resources from proven 
health interventions, other police priorities, and other social 
services.35 
• The illicit drug trade creates a hostile environment for le-
gitimate business interests. It deters investment and tourism, 
creates sector volatility and unfair competition (associated 
with money laundering), and distorts the macroeconomic 
stability of entire countries.
• The illicit drug business also corrodes governance. A 1998 
study from Mexico36 estimated that cocaine traffickers spent 
as much as $500 million a year on bribes, more than the 
annual budget of the Mexican attorney general’s office. As 
of 2011, Mexican and Colombian drug trafficking groups 
launder up to $39 billion a year in wholesale distribution 
proceeds.37 
Punitive drug law enforcement fuels crime and maximizes 
the health risks associated with drug use, especially 
among the most vulnerable. This is because drug 
production, shipment and retail are left in the hands 
of organized criminals, and people who use drugs are 
criminalized, rather than provided with assistance.
• Clandestine production and retail often leads to adulter-
ated drug products of unknown potency and purity that pose 
significantly higher risks. Examples of this problem include 
heroin contaminated with anthrax,11 and cocaine cut with 
levamisole (a de-worming agent).12 
• More than one third (37 per cent) of Russia’s 1.8 million 
people injecting drugs are infected with HIV. Owing to a 
preference for criminalizing users, access to life-saving harm 
reduction services, such as needle exchange and syringe 
programs (NSP), is either highly restricted, or in the case of 
opioid substitution treatment (OST), banned outright.13
• The current drug control regime has generated significant 
legal and political obstacles to the provision of opiates for 
pain control and palliative care. There are over 5.5 billion 
people with severely limited or no access to the medicines 
they need.14  
• Restrictive policies increase the risk of premature death 
from overdoses and acute negative reactions to drug 
consumption. For example, in 2010, there were more than 
20,000 illicit-drug overdose deaths in the US.15 Naloxone – a 
drug that can counter the effects of opiate overdoses – is still 
not universally available.
Punitive approaches to drug policy are severely 
undermining human rights in every region of the world. 
They lead to the erosion of civil liberties and fair trial 
standards, the stigmatization of individuals and groups – 
particularly women, young people, and ethnic minorities – 
and the imposition of abusive and inhumane punishments.
• Although the death penalty for drug offences is illegal 
under international law16 it is nevertheless retained by 33 
countries. As a result of such offences, around 1,000 people 
are executed every year.17 
• Drug law enforcement has fuelled a dramatic expansion 
of people in detention (prisons, pretrial detainees, people 
held in administrative detention). Many people are held in 
mandatory ‘drug detention’ centers, including some 235,000 
people in China and South East Asia.18
• Globally, more women are imprisoned for drug offences 
than for any other crime.19 One in four women in prison 
across Europe and Central Asia are incarcerated for drug 
offences,20 while in many Latin American countries such as 
Argentina (68.2 per cent),21 Costa Rica (70 per cent)22 and 
Peru (66.38 per cent)23 the rates are higher still.
• Drug law enforcement disproportionately impacts on 
minorities. In the US, African Americans make up 13 per cent 
of the population. Yet they account for 33.6 per cent of drug 
arrests and 37 per cent of people sent to state prison on 
drug charges. Similar racial disparities have been observed 
elsewhere including the UK,24 Canada25 and Australia.26 
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Global 
In 2011, the Global Commission 
on Drug Policy launched its 
report - War on Drugs. The report 
has transformed the global 
debate on drug policy. Its launch 
inspired national changes in 
legislation and emboldened 
civil societies to call for reform 
around the world. 
PATHWAYS TO DRUG POLICY REFORM 
AROUND THE WORLD
Many countries are already changing their drug 
policies. And there are multiple pathways to more 
humane and effective strategies.
Ecuador 
Ecuador decriminalized personal 
possession of drugs in 1990, and 
in 2008 pardoned many so-called 
‘drug mules’ who were serving prison 
sentences.
Washington and Colorado in the United States 
In 2012, following ballot initiatives approved by voters, the states of 
Washington and Colorado became the first jurisdictions in the world 
to establish legally regulated markets for non-medical cannabis. 
Bolivia 
In 2012, Bolivia became the first country to withdraw from the 
1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, following a dispute 
over the traditional cultivation and use of coca leaf. It was later 
readmitted to the convention, with a reservation on coca.
Uruguay 
In 2013, Uruguay became 
the first nation state to pass 
legislation to establish a 
legal, regulated market for 
non-medical cannabis.
New Zealand 
In 2013, New Zealand 
passed groundbreaking 
legislation that permits 
the legally regulated sale 
of certain lower-risk novel 
psychoactive substances 
(NPS), the control of which 
is not covered by existing 
international law.
Tanzania  
In 2013, Tanzania became 
the first sub-Saharan 
country to launch a national 
methadone program.
The Americas  
In 2013, the Organization 
of American States 
published its ‘Report on 
the Drug Problem in the 
Americas’40  – the first 
report from a multilateral 
organization to meaningfully 
engage with wider drug law 
reform questions.
Spain and Belgium 
Since 2005, activist-led ‘cannabis social clubs’ 
have utilized laws that permit small-scale 
cultivation of cannabis plants for personal 
consumption, in order to establish a de facto 
legal system of production and supply for club 
members.
Latin America 
In 2009, led by three former presidents, 
the Latin American Commission on 
Drugs and Democracy launched ‘Drugs 
and Democracy: Towards a Paradigm 
Shift’,39 kick-starting the high level 
hemispheric debate on drug law reform. 
Czech Republic 
In 2009, the Czech Republic removed 
criminal penalties for personal drug 
possession, following an impact 
assessment that demonstrated the 
failings of previous punitive approaches.
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West Africa 
A 2014 report by the West 
Africa Commission on Drugs 
cautioned: “West Africa must 
not become a new front line 
in the failed ‘war on drugs,’ 
which has neither reduced 
drug consumption nor put 
traffickers out of business”, 
and recommended “the 
consumption and possession 
for personal use of drugs 
should not be criminalized”.41
The Caribbean 
Cannabis law reform is now 
being discussed across 
the region. In Jamaica, 
a government taskforce 
has been investigating the 
possibility of legally regulating 
the drug, and in 2014 a new 
decriminalization approach 
to cannabis possession was 
announced.
UNGASS 2016 
United Nations 
General Assembly 
Special Session on the 
World Drug Problem. 
Momentum for reform 
is building.
Switzerland, Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands 
Since the 1980s, these countries have pioneered the 
development of pragmatic approaches to reducing the 
harms faced by people who inject drugs, establishing 
needle and syringe programs, opiate substitution 
treatment, heroin-assisted treatment programs and 
supervised drug consumption facilities.
United States 
Today, 23 US states have legal medical cannabis markets, and 17 
states have decriminalized the personal possession of cannabis for 
non-medical use since Oregon became the first to do so in 1973. 
Reforms are also currently underway that would put an end to the use 
of mandatory minimum sentences for low-level drug offenders.
The Netherlands 
A 1976 law led to the evolution of a de facto legal system of cannabis 
sales, made via so-called cannabis ‘coffee shops’. Pressure is now 
growing from municipal governments and the public to legally regulate 
not just retail supply, but production too.
Iran  
Since 2000, the provision of harm reduction 
services, including opioid substitution 
treatment and needle and syringe programs, 
has expanded in Iran. The country now also 
provides such services to prisoners.
Ukraine 
Since 2004, Ukraine, supported 
by the Global Fund, has had the 
most extensive harm reduction 
provision in Eastern Europe. By 
2012 it reached over 171,000 
people who use drugs, with 
numbers of new HIV cases falling 
in 2011 for the first time since 
1999.38 
China and vietnam 
Long opposed to harm reduction 
measures, both China and 
Vietnam have since 2004 
adopted large-scale opioid 
substitution and needle and 
syringe programs
Canada  
Canada is home to two medically 
supervised safer injecting facilities, the 
first of which opened in 2003. At these 
facilities, dependent drug users can 
inject pre-obtained illicit drugs. Canada 
has also conducted two trials of heroin 
assisted therapy.
Portugal 
In 2001, Portugal removed criminal penalties 
for personal possession of all drugs and 
implemented a more health-centered approach 
to drugs that included proven harm reduction 
measures.
Australia 
The Sydney Medically Supervised Injection 
Centre was opened in 2001.
Moldova  
Since 1999, Moldova has been considered 
a world leader in provision of harm reduction 
services in prisons, including opioid substitution 
treatment and needle and syringe programs.
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The international drug control system was founded with two  
core goals. First, it sought to reduce the negative health consequences 
generated by drugs. Second, it promised to guarantee access 
to essential medicines. Neither of these aims has been achieved. 
To the contrary, drug policy emphasizing criminal justice has 
generated new social and health problems.
The Global Commission recommends a comprehensive approach  
to drug policy. If governments are to deliver on the original promise 
of the international drug control system, ineffective and harmful 
enforcement-led approaches must be replaced with responses that 
prioritize public health and community safety. There are at least 
five basic policy shifts that are urgently required.
The five pathways proposed by the Global Commission are 
complementary — they form a comprehensive set of proposals. 
There are some that can and should be implemented at once. 
Putting health first is essential. Ensuring access to life-saving 
medicines, ending criminalization, and refocusing law enforcement 
are immediate actions that can and should be pursued now. 
Regulation offers the most transformative route to getting drugs 
under control, reducing violence, undermining crime and improving 
people’s safety and wellbeing.
2.
KEY PATHWAYS  
TO DRUG POLICIES 
THAT WORK
Re
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s
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Virtually everyone agrees that the good health of the population 
should be the first priority of drug policy. Yet if this aspiration is to 
be realized in practice, a change of approach is urgently needed. 
In addition to a redoubled focus on reducing drug-related health 
harms (above all dependency, overdose, and the transmission of 
infectious blood-borne diseases) there is also a need to clarify the 
principles underpinning an approach that genuinely focuses on 
public health. 
Such an approach must overcome political barriers and be backed 
by adequate investment in evidence-based policy and practice. It 
should enable societies to more effectively prevent and delay drug 
use among young people, reduce risks for those who do decide to 
experiment with drugs, and provide appropriate treatment options 
for individuals with dependence or substance use disorders. 
Prevention, harm reduction and treatment strategies should also 
be compliant with basic human rights, respond compassionately 
to the needs of the intended beneficiaries and be cost-effective. 
Unfortunately, the emotive and ideological nature of drug policy 
means this is seldom the case. Instead, best practice is frequently 
derailed by unhelpful and unrealistic aspirations for a ‘drug-
free world’ and an overly narrow focus on abstinence-based 
approaches. Policies too often rely on expensive ‘zero-tolerance’ 
measures which routinely do more harm than good, and there is 
rarely real engagement with robust monitoring and evaluation to 
measure impacts. 
REDUCING HARMS ASSOCIATED 
WITH DRUG USE
Many interventions that successfully reduce the harms associated 
with drug use are strongly supported by scientific evidence.48  
These include needle exchange and syringe programs, opioid 
substitution treatment, supervised drug consumption facilities, 
and overdose prevention and reversal (including the provision 
of naloxone49). These measures are highly cost-effective and, 
where adequately resourced, contribute to significant public 
health improvements.50 However, there are considerable political 
TREATMENT
Treating problematic or dependent drug use is a key responsibility 
of governments. It is not just a moral obligation, but also clearly 
defined within international drug control and human rights laws. A 
wide range of treatment options exists – including various psycho-
social, abstinence-based, behavioral and substitution-based 
therapies – which have been shown to be effective at improving 
health and reducing the social costs of drug misuse. 
The treatment model most likely to deliver the best outcomes 
for an individual is one decided between the individual and 
their doctor or service provider, free from political interference 
or coercion. The concept of ‘holistic care’ is also important, and 
can improve treatment outcomes. It involves addressing not only 
an individual’s drug-use issues, but other areas of his or her life 
including mental health, housing, and employment training.  
However, in most countries the range of available treatments is 
limited. It is often restricted to a single abstinence-only model, 
while provision is only sufficient to meet a small fraction of 
demand, or is poorly targeted, failing to focus resources where 
need is greatest. At the same time, abusive practices carried out 
in the name of treatment, such as arbitrary detention, forced labor, 
and physical or psychological abuse, continue to be widespread.55 
“The concept of ‘harm reduction’ is often 
made into an unnecessarily controversial 
issue as if there were a contradiction 
between prevention and treatment on 
one hand, and reducing the adverse 
health and social consequences of 
drug use on the other hand. This is a 
false dichotomy. These policies are 
complementary.”54
UN Office on Drugs and Crime ‘World 
Drugs Report 2008’ 
“In seeking to reduce drug-related harm, 
without judgment, and with respect for 
the inherent dignity of every individual, 
regardless of lifestyle, harm reduction 
stands as a clear example of human 
rights in practice.”43
Professor Paul Hunt, former UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Right  
to Health, 2010
RECOMMENDATION 1
Putting health and community safety first 
requires a fundamental reorientation of 
policy priorities and resources, from failed 
punitive enforcement to proven health and 
social interventions. Both the stated goals 
of drug control policies, and the criteria by 
which such policies are assessed, merit 
reform. Traditional goals and measures 
– such as hectares of illicit crops 
eradicated, amounts of drugs seized, and 
number of people arrested, prosecuted, 
convicted and incarcerated for drug law 
violations – have failed to produce positive 
outcomes.
 
Far more important are goals and 
measures that focus on reducing 
both drug-related harms such as fatal 
overdoses, HIV/AIDS, hepatitis and 
other diseases as well as prohibition-
related harms such as crime, violence, 
corruption, human rights violations, 
environmental degradation, displacement 
of communities, and the power of 
criminal organizations. Spending on 
counterproductive enforcement measures 
should be ended, while proven prevention, 
harm reduction and treatment measures 
are scaled up to meet need.
PREvENTION  
Prevention includes interventions that prevent and delay the 
initiation of drug use, address high-risk behavior, and limit 
progression to dependent or problematic use. Such interventions 
are a vital front-line component of a health-centered approach.  
The evidence of effectiveness for different preventive interventions 
is growing. Even so, there are gaps in knowledge since most 
research is conducted in higher-income environments,42 particularly 
North America and Western Europe. As a result, most scientific 
evaluations are biased toward abstinence-based approaches, 
school-based programs and intervention aimed at young children. 
There is a pressing need for more rigorous evaluations of a wider 
range of interventions, including in medium- and low-income 
settings.
In many countries, prevention strategies are still narrowly confined 
to simplistic drug education measures. Such programs advocate 
‘just say no’ messaging, shock tactics and the provision of selective 
– and in many cases erroneous – information. While aligned with 
political priorities advocating zero tolerance, the available evidence 
indicates that these strategies – in particular those that involve 
mass-media campaigns and drug testing in schools – are at best 
ineffective, and at worst harmful.44,45,46 In many cases, young 
people simply do not trust prevention messages issued by state 
authorities – particularly if those authorities are simultaneously 
administering punitive sanctions to those who possess and use 
drugs.
A wider array of evidence-based interventions is necessary to 
address the many needs of different groups, and adequate 
resourcing for both services and evaluation is essential. A ‘just say 
know’ approach may yield a more positive impact among those 
for whom a ‘just say no’ campaign has failed. Prioritizing safety 
and responsibility among older youth is a priority. A reliance on 
abstinence alone seldom generates lasting results. Instead what 
is needed is an emphasis on supporting young people to make 
informed decisions based on credible scientific information. 
The most effective forms of prevention are those that are 
comprehensive. Rather than pursuing stand-alone interventions, 
drug prevention strategies should be integrated into a wider social 
and health policy framework, addressing environmental influences 
and opportunities for social development. This means informing 
and encouraging responsible decision making not just around 
drugs, but also of other risky behaviors, including alcohol and 
tobacco use, unsafe sex, and unhealthy eating. Prevention should 
also address populations that are historically overlooked, including 
non-dependent users of drugs in environments outside school 
such as street and club scenes.47
Instead of punitive and harmful prohibition, policies should prioritize the safeguarding 
of people’s health and safety. This means investing in community protection, 
prevention, harm reduction, and treatment as cornerstones of drug policy.
2.1 PUT PEOPLE’S HEALTH AND SAFETY FIRST
obstacles to the provision of harm reduction. Many elected officials 
and their constituents are reluctant to accept the impossibility of 
eradicating drugs. They often feel that support to harm reduction 
somehow condones the use of drugs. As a result, funding is 
often several orders of magnitude less than that allocated for law 
enforcement.51,52 The Global Commission reiterates its calls for 
the scaling-up of harm reduction services to meet demand – in 
accordance with the joint guidance provided by WHO, UNAIDS and 
UNODC53 – and that legislative and political obstacles to such 
provision be lifted wherever they remain.
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The international drug control system is failing to ensure equitable access to essential 
medicines such as morphine and methadone, leading to unnecessary pain and suffering.  
The political obstacles that are preventing member states from ensuring an adequate 
provision of such medicines must be removed.
Access to essential medicines is a core component of the 
internationally recognized right to the highest attainable standard 
of health.56,57 Although such access is one of the two core aims 
of the international drug control system, concerns regarding the 
abuse and diversion of opiates into the criminal market have 
overshadowed the goal from the outset. Owing to what some 
physicians call ‘opioidphobia’ there is a continued lack of, or 
inadequate access to, essential medicines for the treatment of 
severe pain and opioid dependence around the world.
Global and national drug control efforts aimed at prohibiting the 
non-medical use of opioids have a chilling effect on medical use in 
lower- and middle-income countries. Unduly restrictive regulations 
and policies – such as those limiting doses or banning particular 
preparations – are routinely imposed in the name of preventing 
diversion. According to the WHO, these measures contribute 
to a global health crisis which leaves over 5.5 billion people 
(83 per cent of the world’s population) – including 5.5 million 
terminal cancer patients – with little or no access to opioid-based 
medicines.58  
As of 2014, strong opioids and opiates are virtually unobtainable 
in over 150 countries. Consequently, access to opioid substitution 
treatment remains heavily restricted in the majority of UN member 
states, and in some states, including Russia, banned altogether. 
This is despite the fact that morphine and methadone are both 
included on the WHO Model List of Essential Medicines.59
 
Removing barriers to the provision of essential opioid medicines 
is a global public health priority that demands the international 
community’s urgent attention.60 It is not acceptable to wait for 
broader reform consensus; demand for these medicines is driven 
not by parochial political expediencies, but by the universal human 
susceptibility to illness and pain. The international community must 
make equitable access to controlled medicines for pain, palliative 
care and opioid dependency a top priority as the developing 
world confronts the growing burden of ageing, accidents, and non-
communicable diseases.
2.2 ENSURE ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL 
MEDICINES AND PAIN CONTROL
RECOMMENDATION 2
Ensure equitable access to essential 
medicines, in particular opiate-based 
medications for pain. More than 80 
per cent of the world´s population carries 
a huge burden of avoidable pain and 
suffering with little or no access to such 
medications. This state of affairs persists 
despite the fact that the avoidance of ill 
health is a key objective and obligation 
of the global drug control regime. 
Governments need to establish clear plans 
and timelines to remove the domestic and 
international obstacles to such provision. 
They also should provide the necessary 
funding for an international program – to 
be overseen by the WHO and developed 
in partnership with the UNODC and the 
INCB – to ensure equitable and affordable 
access to these medicines where they are 
unavailable.
Criminalizing people for the possession and use of drugs is wasteful and counterproductive. 
It increases health harms and stigmatizes vulnerable populations, and contributes to 
an exploding prison population. Ending criminalization is a prerequisite of any genuinely 
health-centered drug policy.
2.3 END THE CRIMINALIZATION AND INCARCERATION 
OF PEOPLE WHO USE DRUGS
Punitive drug law enforcement is predicated on the idea that 
criminalization serves as a deterrent. Notwithstanding its popularity, 
this theory is not supported by evidence. Instead, research indi-
cates that criminalizing drug users actually worsens drug-related 
problems. Comparative studies among different countries reveal 
no correlation between intensity of enforcement and prevalence of 
use.61  Research within countries, looking at the effects of changes 
in drug laws over time, comes to the same conclusion.62,63 
But criminalization is not only ineffective from the perspective of 
deterring use. As detailed in previous Global Commission reports,64 
criminalization – whether of drug use, possession of small quanti-
ties for personal use, or possession of drug paraphernalia – is a 
key driver of a range of health and social harms. Criminalization is 
the opposite of a pragmatic, health-centered, harm reduction ap-
proach – it is, in effect, a policy of harm maximization.
Criminalization has a disproportionately damaging impact on 
public health affecting populations who are already marginalized 
and vulnerable. It encourages higher-risk behavior such as the 
sharing of injection equipment, which leads to HIV and hepatitis 
C transmission.65 Criminalization pushes drug use into unhygienic 
marginal environments, increasing the risk of infection and death 
from overdose, and it expands the total population of people using 
and injecting drugs in prison, a high-risk environment widely 
associated with poor health service provision.
Furthermore, criminalization introduces political and practical 
obstacles to the implementation of proven health interventions. 
Many of those most in need of treatment, harm reduction, or 
credible information – in particular young people who may be 
beginning to experiment with drugs – are reluctant to seek help 
for fear of arrest, a criminal record, and the resulting stigma. 
Criminalization also discourages people from requesting medical 
assistance when friends or family members suffer overdoses. The 
introduction of ‘Good Samaritan’ laws in most US states,66 which 
encourage people to call emergency services by offering them 
immunity from prosecution, are a good example of a pragmatic 
harm reduction approach. 
Ultimately, the criminalization of drug users brings no benefits 
to society. Instead, it generates a legacy of stigmatization, 
undermining basic life opportunities such as access to housing, 
“Countries should work toward 
developing policies and laws that 
decriminalize injection and other use of 
drugs and, thereby, reduce incarceration. 
Countries should work toward developing 
policies and laws that decriminalize the 
use of clean needles and syringes (and 
that permit NSPs) and that legalize OST 
for people who are opioid-dependent. 
Countries should ban compulsory 
treatment for people who use and/or 
inject drugs.” 67
World Health Organization, 2014
credit and personal finance and meaningful employment. 
Paradoxically, all of these protective factors are positively correlated 
with improved likelihood of recovery for problematic users, and 
health and wellbeing of people who use drugs more broadly. 
Yet substantial resources are still devoted to counterproductive 
enforcement measures, while proven health interventions are 
starved of resources, a situation that must be reversed.
The Global Commission contends that for any jurisdiction, ending 
the criminalization of people who use drugs (commonly referred 
to as ‘decriminalization’ — see Glossary, page 45) is an absolute 
prerequisite for any genuinely health-based approach. This is the 
baseline from which future policy and programming innovations 
can evolve. Taking this first step is an urgent priority, and since it 
requires no amendment to existing UN drug treaties, it can happen 
immediately with no international legal implications.68
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REvISITING DRUG COURTS
Several countries have taken concrete steps to replace 
the incarceration of drug offenders with their diversion 
into supervised treatment programs monitored and en-
forced by the criminal justice system. The most notable 
example of this practice is the use of ‘drug courts’ in 
the US, which are widely lauded across North America. 
Compared to more punitive responses, drug courts 
appear – at least superficially – to be a move in the 
right direction. Yet the devil is in the detail of how such 
programs are administered. Most sentences issued by 
drug courts demand abstinence, with opioid substitu-
tion treatment often arbitrarily denied.70 There are good 
reasons to be skeptical of their effectiveness.71 
Abstinence is typically enforced with regular drug  
testing and the threat of incarceration for those who  
register positive results. This in effect means that 
people are punished for relapse – an acknowledged 
reality in drug dependence. It also raises ethical 
concerns about whether and when treatment can 
involve coercion.72 Individuals are required to waive 
constitutional trial rights to participate in drug court 
programs: failure to successfully complete the program 
results in an automatic criminal conviction. 
Although some types of court-ordered treatment may 
be appropriate for certain drug-using offenders guilty 
of violent or predatory offences, this is not the case for 
those convicted only of drug possession or use. The 
Commission finds that, on their own, drug courts are 
conceptually flawed and insufficient. They represent an 
attempt to retrospectively impose a health-based ap-
proach within a failed criminal justice paradigm. What 
is required is a more fundamental realignment towards 
a public health centered paradigm, one that both 
reduces the likelihood of people who use drugs coming 
into contact with the criminal justice system in the first 
place, and that also makes prevention, harm reduction 
and treatment services available according to need. 
RECOMMENDATION 3
Stop criminalizing people for drug use 
and possession – and stop imposing 
‘compulsory treatment’ on people 
whose only offense is drug use or 
possession. Criminalization of drug use 
and possession has little to no impact 
on levels of drug use in an open society. 
Such policies do, however, encourage 
high risk behaviours such as unsafe 
injecting, deter people in need of drug 
treatment from seeking it, divert law 
enforcement resources from focusing on 
serious criminality, reduce personal and 
government funds that might otherwise 
be available for positive investment in 
people’s lives, and burden millions with 
the long-lasting negative consequences of 
a criminal conviction. Using the criminal 
justice system to force people arrested 
for drug possession into ‘treatment’ often 
does more harm than good. Far better 
is ensuring the availability of diverse 
supportive services in communities. This 
recommendation, it should be noted, 
requires no reform of international drug 
control treaties.
Ending the criminalization of people who use drugs does not 
mean rejecting the role of the police or criminal justice system. 
But it does imply that some rethinking of their roles is required, 
together with the metrics and strategies used to judge successful 
drug policy. There are many examples of measures demonstrating 
how local police forces can work in partnership with public health 
professionals and other service providers to achieve better health 
outcomes. 
Police can actively support harm reduction measures such as 
needle exchange and syringe programs, opioid substitution therapy, 
and supervised drug consumption facilities, and can be trained 
in overdose prevention. When people who use drugs come into 
contact with police, they can also be referred to relevant health 
services.69 Overall, police can play a crucial role in promoting 
community safety, though this demands adequate investment in 
strategic direction, management and training. 
A more targeted enforcement approach is needed to reduce the harms of the illicit drug 
markets and ensure peace and security. Governments should deprioritize the pursuit of 
non-violent and minor participants in the market, instead directing enforcement resources 
towards the most disruptive and violent elements of the drug trade.
2.4 REFOCUS ENFORCEMENT RESPONSES TO  
DRUG TRAFFICKING AND ORGANIZED CRIME
Reversing the current punitive approach to drug users does not 
mean scaling down the fight against organized criminals involved 
in the drug trade. The extent of drug trafficking organizations is 
immense and growing in many regions generating widespread 
violence, insecurity, corruption, economic and political  
instability.73,74,75 But if meaningful progress is to be made in 
tackling these problems, policy makers must, as part of the wider 
paradigm shift advocated by the Global Commission, challenge 
and reconsider a number of established assumptions, goals, and 
practices when it comes to taking on organized crime. 
A starting point must be an acknowledgement that prohibition, in 
the face of rising global demand, is counterproductive. It creates 
the vast profit margins that sustain the illegal trade and enriches 
organized crime groups responsible for undermining peace and 
security around the globe. Many veteran police representatives fully 
understand this issue, and their concerns should be listened to.76  
A sober analysis is required of the unintended negative conse-
quences of misguided drug law enforcement and the costs and 
benefits arising from different forms of intervention. 
Furthermore, misconceptions about drug markets and how they 
function must be corrected. For one, significant sectors of the trade 
function in a relatively stable and non-violent manner, and the ma-
jority of those involved are not violent cartel members. Most drug 
growers, drug mules and drug runners are drawn into the trade 
not out of greed, but economic necessity. Some refer to the drug 
economy as a ‘survival economy’.77 Harsh enforcement targeting 
these individuals and groups not only fails to generate a meaning-
ful impact on the scale of illicit drug markets, it also drains limited 
resources, results in overcrowded prisons, encourages low-level 
corruption, and undermines families and communities. 
The burden of enforcement responses to curb drug production 
and trafficking invariably falls heaviest on the most vulnerable and 
marginalized members of society – low-income groups, children 
and young people, women, people who are dependent on drugs, 
and ethnic minorities. The case for ending punitive responses to 
low-level, non-violent operatives in the illicit drug trade is therefore 
based on much of the same pragmatic reasoning that underpins 
the case for eliminating penalties for people who use drugs. It can 
also be made on development grounds, since enforcement dispro-
portionately hits the poor and marginalized. 
The first priority should be to put in place more proportionate 
responses. To start with, this will require immediately ending the 
illegal use of the death penalty and corporal punishment,78 as 
well as the expensive and counterproductive use of incarceration. 
Where punitive sanctions are deployed, these should preferably 
be community-based and include support for helping people exit 
from the drug trade, promoting rehabilitation, developing skills and 
alternative livelihoods. Such approaches are not only more humane 
- they are cost-effective. The resort to criminal prosecutions should 
be avoided. The stigma that accompanies a criminal record makes 
reintegration into the legitimate economy more difficult and re-
entry into the criminal economy more likely. 
An alternative response is also necessary to deal with those higher 
up the criminal hierarchy. The ‘war on drugs’ represents a poor 
application of strategy and tactics. Approaches must instead be 
measured and pragmatic if peace and stability are to be restored 
where a culture of war has flourished. All-out militarized enforce-
ment responses have, counter-intuitively, undermined security in 
places like Afghanistan, Colombia, and Mexico.  
“For decades, Colombia implemented all 
conceivable measures to fight the drug 
trade in a massive effort whose benefits 
were not proportional to the vast amount 
of resources invested and the human 
costs involved. Despite the country’s 
significant achievements in fighting the 
drug cartels and lowering the levels of 
violence and crime, the areas of illegal 
cultivation are again expanding as well as 
the flow of drugs coming out of Colombia 
and the Andean region.” 79 
Latin American Commission on Drugs 
and Democracy, 2009
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A 2011 review found that increased enforcement pressure on illicit 
drug markets around the world was associated with increases, 
rather than decreases, in levels of violence.80 In some cases, milita-
rized responses in one country have resulted in dramatic spikes in 
violence in others.81 
Nor is there compelling evidence that supply-side enforcement has 
achieved lasting reductions in total drug production or availability. 
Despite increasing resources directed towards eradication and 
interdiction, drug production has more than kept pace with growing 
global demand, and localized ‘successes’ often appear to displace 
production or trafficking routes elsewhere (the ‘balloon effect’ 
described by the UNODC82). Militarized enforcement responses 
have sometimes led to infiltration and corruption of governments, 
armies and police by cartels, and a culture of impunity for 
human rights abuses, especially extra-judicial killings and 
disappearances.83 
Where enforcement lacks strategic direction, it is generally the 
lowest down in the drug supply chain who are affected. The focus 
on generic targets such as arrest quotas or drug seizures can lead 
to a spike in apprehensions and arrests, but often of the least 
relevant players. Such approaches yield virtually no long-term 
impact on levels of drug production since there is always a ready 
supply of individuals willing to fill the resulting labor gap. Instead 
what is achieved is a temporary geographical displacement of 
criminal activity and the overloading of prisons and criminal  
justice systems.84
“West Africa, a region with limited 
resources, would remove a huge weight 
from an already over-burdened criminal 
justice system if it were to decriminalize 
drug use and possession, and expend 
greater effort in pursuing those traffickers 
whose ‘pernicious behavior has a much 
deeper impact on society,’ and rooting out 
corruption from within. More specifically, 
freed up resources can be channeled 
to more promising law enforcement 
alternatives such as ‘focused-deterrence 
strategies, selective targeting, and 
sequential interdiction efforts.” 85  
 
West Africa Commission  
on Drugs, 2014
“I’ve been a health minister in my past 
and there’s no doubt that the health 
position would be to treat the issue of 
drugs as primarily a health and social 
issue rather than a criminalized issue...
To deal with drugs as a one-dimensional, 
law-and-order issue is to miss the point ... 
We have waves of violent crime sustained 
by drug trade, so we have to take the 
money out of drugs ... The countries in 
the region that have been ravaged by 
the armed violence associated with drug 
cartels are starting to think laterally about 
a broad range of approaches and they 
should be encouraged to do that ... They 
should act on evidence.” 86 
Helen Clark, Administrator of  
the United Nations Development 
Program, 2013
Looking forward, attempts to prevent and reduce the harms 
generated by organized crime involvement in drug production 
and trafficking must involve social and economic development 
for affected communities. Governments can also support moves 
to progressively reduce the influence of organized crime groups 
through a phased transition towards legally regulated drug markets 
(see 2.5). These two approaches are, however, not the only ways 
in which the harm caused by illicit drug markets and organized 
crime can be lessened. There is good evidence that, in the shorter 
term, more strategically deployed enforcement efforts can reduce 
violence and insecurity. 
RECOMMENDATION 4
Rely on alternatives to incarceration for 
non-violent, low-level participants in illicit 
drug markets such as farmers, couriers 
and others involved in the production, 
transport and sale of illicit drugs. 
Governments devote ever increasing 
resources to detecting, arresting and 
incarcerating people involved in illicit drug 
markets – with little or no evidence that 
such efforts reduce drug-related problems 
or deter others from engaging in similar 
activities. Community-based and other 
non-criminal sanctions routinely prove 
far less expensive, and more effective 
than criminalization and incarceration. 
Subsistence farmers and day laborers 
involved in harvesting, processing, 
transporting or trading who have taken 
refuge in this illicit economy purely for 
reasons of survival of their families should 
not be subjected to criminal punishment. 
Only longer-term socio-economic 
development efforts that improve access 
to land and jobs, reduce economic 
inequality and social marginalization, 
and enhance security can offer them a 
legitimate exit strategy.
RECOMMENDATION 5
Focus on reducing the power of criminal 
organizations as well as the violence and 
insecurity that result from their competition 
with both one another and the state. 
Governments need to be far more strategic, 
anticipating the ways in which particular law 
enforcement initiatives, particularly militarized 
‘crackdowns’, may often exacerbate criminal 
violence and public insecurity without actually 
deterring drug production, trafficking or 
consumption. Displacing illicit drug production 
from one locale to another, or control of a 
trafficking route from one criminal organization 
to another, often does more harm than good. 
The goals of supply-side enforcement need 
to be reoriented from unachievable market 
eradication to achievable reductions in 
violence and disruption linked to the trafficking. 
Enforcement resources should be directed 
towards the most disruptive, problematic 
and violent elements of the trade – alongside 
international cooperation to crack-down on 
corruption and money laundering. Militarizing 
anti-drug efforts is seldom effective and often 
counterproductive. Greater accountability for 
human rights abuses committed in pursuit of 
drug law enforcement is essential.
Governments could benefit by redefining the goals of drug law  
enforcement to what is achievable rather than arbitrary politically 
motivated benchmarks. This requires adopting an approach to 
managing problematic drug markets that is, in some respects, 
analogous to harm reduction approaches for managing 
problematic drug users. In practice, this means focusing on 
reducing the most pernicious effects of illicit markets, rather than 
necessarily eradicating them. The deployment of resources toward 
the most violent and disruptive elements of illicit drug markets can 
be an effective way of achieving this.87 
Recent experiences in Latin American and North American cities 
have demonstrated that it is possible to reduce the drug trade’s 
negative impacts with demographically and geographically focused 
strategies.88 Selective deterrence focused on high-risk perpetra-
tors, especially gangs, has yielded some positive returns. Likewise, 
intelligence-led targeting of enforcement that increases the costs 
for the most disruptive elements of the drug market, can maximize 
the impact of limited enforcement resources and improve public 
safety. 89,90,91,92
Such refocused efforts can complement ongoing international 
co-operation to address money laundering and corruption related 
to the illicit drug trade. Investment in strengthening criminal justice 
institutions will also support more effective enforcement responses. 
However, this does not imply simply increasing the ‘firepower’ of 
law enforcers. Rather, it requires that resources should be directed 
towards reinforcing the rule of law and fostering trust between 
communities and the police. A key element of this process is better 
monitoring and improved systems of accountability, so that law en-
forcement officials do not operate within a culture of impunity that 
too often permits human rights abuses and perpetuates corruption.
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The regulation of drugs should be pursued because they are risky, not 
because they are safe. Different models of regulation can be applied for 
different drugs according to the risks they pose. In this way, regulation can 
reduce social and health harms and disempower organized crime.
2.5 REGULATE DRUG MARKETS 
TO PUT GOvERNMENTS  
IN CONTROL
FIGURE 1. GETTING DRUGS UNDER CONTROL94
Ending the criminalization of people who use drugs is vital, but it 
does little or nothing to address the harm associated with illicit 
drug markets. The continued expansion of the illicit trade despite 
growing enforcement efforts aimed at curtailing it demonstrates 
the futility of repressive prohibitions. Therefore, following pragmatic 
harm reduction principles, in the longer term, drug markets should 
be responsibly regulated by government authorities. Without legal 
regulation, control, and enforcement, the drug trade will remain 
in the hands of organized criminals. Ultimately this is a choice 
between control in the hands of governments or gangsters; there is 
no third option in which drug markets can be made to disappear. 
There is a public health imperative to legally regulate drugs 
not because they are safe, but precisely because they can be 
dangerous and pose serious risks. However dangerous a particular 
drug may be on its own, its risks increase, sometimes dramatically, 
when it is produced, sold and consumed in an unregulated criminal 
environment. Drugs of unknown strength are sold with no quality 
controls, often cut with adulterants, bulking agents or other drugs,93 
and lack information about contents, risks or safety guidance. 
Putting accountable governments and regulatory bodies in control 
of this market can significantly reduce these risks.
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Drug regulation is not as radical as many believe. Such a move 
does not require a fundamental rethink of established policy 
principles. The regulation and management of risky products and 
behaviors is a key function of all government authorities around 
the world, and is the norm in almost all other areas of policy and 
law. Governments regulate everything from alcohol and cigarette 
consumption to medicines, seatbelts, the use of fireworks, power-
tools and high-risk sports. If the potential risks of drugs are to 
be contained and minimized, governments must apply the same 
regulatory logic to the development of effective drug policies.
There is a wide spectrum of policy options available for control-
ling the production, supply and use of various types of drugs 
(see graphic on page 29). At one end of this spectrum are illegal, 
criminally controlled markets subject to a full-scale war on drugs. 
At the other end are legal, unfettered free markets controlled by 
commercial enterprises. Both of these options are characterized by 
an absence of regulation, with governments essentially forfeiting 
control of the drug trade. As presented in Figure 1, appropriately 
regulated legal drug markets can deliver the best social and health 
outcomes from the range of policy models available. 
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It is necessary to distinguish between key terms and concepts in 
order to avoid unnecessary confusion. ‘Legalization’ is merely a 
process — of making something illegal, legal. What most reform 
advocates understand by the term is more usefully described as 
‘regulation’, ‘legal regulation’ or ‘legally regulated markets’. These 
terms refer to the end point of the legalization process – the 
system of rules that govern the production, supply and use of 
drugs. 
Drug markets that are subject to strict legal regulation are not 
‘free markets’. Nor does exploring alternatives to prohibition imply 
a drug market ‘free for all’, where access to drugs is unrestricted 
and availability is dramatically increased. Regulation is about 
taking control, so that governments, not criminals, make decisions 
on the availability and non-availability of different substances, 
in different environments. Inevitably, while some drugs will be 
accessible with appropriate controls and some only available via 
medical prescription,  other more harmful drugs will necessarily 
remain prohibited. Unlike in criminal drug markets, legal regulation 
enables governments to control and regulate most aspects of the 
market, including: 
• Production and transit (location, licensing, and security);
• Products (dosage/potency, preparation, price, and packaging); 
• Vendors (licensing, vetting, and training requirements); 
• Marketing (advertising, branding and promotion);
• Outlets (location, outlet density, and appearance); and
• Access (age controls, licensed buyers, club membership 
schemes, medical prescription) 
“Assuming well-functioning regulatory 
structures, legalization could reduce 
many of the negative consequences 
with which society is most concerned, 
including violence, corruption, and public 
disorder surrounding drug distribution; 
the transmission of blood-borne diseases 
associated with shared needles; and the 
incarceration of hundreds of thousands of 
low-level drug offenders.” 96 
Organization of American States, 2013
“The world needs to discuss new 
approaches … we are basically still 
thinking within the same framework as 
we have done for the last 40 years … A 
new approach should try and take away 
the violent profit that comes with drug 
trafficking … If that means legalizing, and 
the world thinks that’s the solution, I will 
welcome it. I’m not against it.” 97
Juan Manuel Santos, President of 
Colombia, 2011
There is no simple blueprint for drug regulation. A flexible array 
of established regulatory tools is available and will need to 
be applied as appropriate for regulating different drugs, within 
different populations and environments. Just as spirits are 
regulated differently from beer, so the riskier the drug product,  
the more restrictive the controls are likely to be.
It is also important to stress that many activities and products 
would remain prohibited under a system of legal regulation. Sales 
to minors, for example, would obviously not be permitted within 
any regulatory framework. Exploring regulatory models for a range 
of drugs does not suggest that all drugs or drug preparations 
should be made legally available. Maintaining prohibitions on the 
most potent and risky drugs or drug preparations, such as ‘crack’ 
cocaine or ‘krokadil’98 (a homemade injectable opioid) is also a 
health imperative. Responses to the continued use of such high-
risk prohibited substances in any future scenario should, however, 
adhere to the principle of harm reduction, rather than be based on 
the criminalization of users.99 
By way of contrast, under prohibition, no similar product controls 
exist. Drug markets are driven by economic processes that 
encourage the production and supply of more potent – and 
therefore more profitable – drug preparations. For example, 
smokeable cocaine products like crack, ‘paco’ or ‘basuco’ are 
in many places more widely available than less potent, safer 
preparations like coca leaf or other coca-based products.  
Effective regulation could help to gradually reverse this dynamic. 
Depending on the situation, policies ranging from decriminalization 
and harm reduction to legal regulation constitute the pragmatic, 
middle ground position. These and associated interventions 
introduce an appropriate level of government control into a trade 
where there is currently little to none. As well as demonstrating the 
need to regulate some currently illegal drugs, this also points to the 
need to better regulate alcohol and tobacco. These parallel calls 
are not inconsistent; the goals of better regulation are the same, 
but the starting points are different.  
Around the world, the debate about the legal regulation of cannabis 
– and potentially other drugs – is moving into the mainstream.95  
The discussion is no longer a purely theoretical one: multiple 
jurisdictions are developing and implementing models of legal 
cannabis regulation, and regulatory approaches for other drugs 
are also emerging (see box, page 32). Parliamentarians, mayors, 
businessmen, physicians, educators, civil society and religious 
leaders are openly welcoming the debate around drug policy reform 
and the need to experiment. Now that the taboo around regulation 
is broken, it is important to dispel any misconceptions and clarify 
what it means in practice.
“We should not be locking up kids or 
individual users for long stretches of jail 
time when some of the folks who are 
writing those laws have probably done 
the same thing. It’s important for [the 
legalization of cannabis in Colorado 
and Washington] to go forward because 
it’s important for society not to have 
a situation in which a large portion of 
people have at one time or another 
broken the law and only a select few get 
punished.” 100
Barack Obama, President of the  
USA, 2014
Drug regulation is not a leap into the unknown. Many drugs that 
are already prohibited for non-medical use – including opiates, 
amphetamines, cannabis and even cocaine – are currently 
produced safely and securely for medical use without any of the 
chaos, violence and criminality of the illicit trade. Almost half of 
the world’s opium crop is entirely legal, produced under a strict 
regulatory framework for medical purposes.
Experiences with alcohol and tobacco are also instructive. 
While serious concerns remain about inadequate controls on 
the availability and marketing of alcohol and tobacco in many 
regions, these two drugs are produced and transited largely 
without problem – certainly compared to instances where alcohol 
prohibition has been attempted.
A legal regulatory framework therefore establishes strict and 
transparent parameters for the drug trade. Rather than expand 
what is available, it would instead control what is permitted and 
set guidelines for the availability of specific products. The precise 
details of which drugs or drug products should be available and 
under what regulatory framework would need to be decided by 
local jurisdictions themselves, based on their specific realities and 
challenges. 
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RECOMMENDATION 6
Allow and encourage diverse experiments 
in legally regulating markets in currently 
illicit drugs, beginning with but not 
limited to cannabis, coca leaf and certain 
novel psychoactive substances. Much 
can be learned from successes and 
failures in regulating alcohol, tobacco, 
pharmaceutical drugs and other products 
and activities that pose health and other 
risks to individuals and societies. New 
experiments are needed in allowing legal 
but restricted access to drugs that are 
now only available illegally. This should 
include the expansion of heroin-assisted 
treatment for some long-term dependent 
users, which has proven so effective in 
Europe and Canada. Ultimately the most 
effective way to reduce the extensive 
harms of the global drug prohibition 
regime and advance the goals of public 
health and safety is to get drugs under 
control through responsible legal 
regulation.
As with any policy innovation, moving towards a regulated mar-
ket model for drug control involves risks and potential negative 
outcomes. The most frequently raised concern has been that of 
over-commercialization leading to an increase in use and related 
health issues. Minimizing this risk requires moving forward in a 
cautious and incremental manner as the cost-benefit balance of 
different regulatory approaches are better understood. The lessons 
from pioneering regulatory models with cannabis, maintenance 
prescribing and novel psychoactive substances will inform this 
ongoing evidence-led and evolutionary process. 
Key lessons must also be drawn from the successes and failings 
of alcohol and tobacco regulation. If use does increase with moves 
toward regulation – and the possibility cannot be discounted – it 
is worth recalling that the totality of associated social and health 
problems is still likely to decrease. The use of legally produced 
products in regulated environments will be intrinsically safer, the 
harm linked to both the illegal trade and punitive enforcement 
will be reduced, and obstacles to more effective health and social 
interventions removed. Nonetheless, preventing runaway com-
mercialization and limiting profit-motivated marketing that aims 
to initiate or increase consumption, will be a central challenge for 
policy makers and regulators. 
The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control101 provides a 
useful template for how international best practice in trade and 
regulation for non-medical use of a risky drug can be developed, 
implemented and evaluated. The Convention features a level of 
member state support comparable to the three existing prohibition-
ist drug treaties. As in the case of alcohol and tobacco policy, the 
WHO can assume a lead role in assessing regulatory options for 
other drugs and providing clear guidance on best practice. 
An approach that embraces flexibility is crucial. Unlike blanket 
prohibitions, successful regulation models will need to adapt and 
evolve in response to changing circumstances and evidence from 
careful monitoring and evaluation, both positive and negative.102  
The precise details of any framework, and how it evolves, would 
need to be decided by local jurisdictions themselves, based on 
their specific realities, opportunities and challenges rather than 
imposed from above.
Questions also remain around the capacity of some lower- and 
middle-income countries to effectively regulate drug markets given 
the existing difficulties faced regulating alcohol, tobacco and phar-
maceuticals. The question can equally well be asked of such coun-
tries’ capacity to enforce prohibition. There are no easy answers. 
In 2013, New Zealand passed the ‘Psychoactive Substances Act’,103 which allows certain ‘lower risk’ novel psychoactive 
substances (NPS) to be legally produced and sold within a strict regulatory framework.104 The new law puts the onus on 
producers to establish the risks of the products they wish to sell, as well as mandating a minimum purchase age of 18; a 
ban on advertising, except at point of sale; restrictions on which outlets can sell NPS products; and labeling and packaging 
requirements. Criminal penalties – including up to two years in prison – were established for violations of the new law. 
The New Zealand government states: “We are doing this because the current situation is untenable. Current legislation is 
ineffective in dealing with the rapid growth in synthetic psychoactive substances which can be tweaked to be one step ahead 
of controls. Products are being sold without any controls over their ingredients, without testing requirements, or controls over 
where they can be sold.”105
In 2013 Uruguay became the first state to pass legislation to legalize and regulate cannabis for non-medical uses.106 
The Uruguayan model involves a greater level of government control than the more commercial models in the US states of 
Washington and Colorado.107 Under the control of a newly established regulatory body, only production of specified herbal 
cannabis products by state licensed growers is permitted.108 Sales are permitted only via licensed pharmacies, to registered 
adult Uruguayan residents – at prices set by the new regulatory body.109 There is a complete ban on all forms of branding, 
marketing and advertising, and tax revenue will be used to fund new cannabis risk education campaigns.  
Switzerland in the 1980s was faced with a growing public health crisis relating to injecting heroin use. Rather than 
resort to failed punitive responses the Swiss government became part of the wave of European harm reduction pioneers 
implementing a raft of measures including needle and syringe programs (NSP) and opiate substitution treatment. 
Indeed, Switzerland pioneered an innovative new model of heroin assisted therapy (HAT) in which long term users who had 
failed on other programs were (alongside other forms of psycho-social support) prescribed pharmaceutical heroin which 
could be injected under medical supervision in a local day clinic.110 The impressive outcomes on a range of key health 
and criminal justice metrics has led to similar programs being launched in other countries including Canada, Germany, the 
Netherlands,  and the UK. 
NATIONAL ExPERIENCES
There are at least five basic possibilities for 
regulating drug supply and availability,111 all of 
which have been applied to existing products:
• Medical prescription model (which may include 
supervised drug consumption facilities) – The riski-
est drugs, such as injectable heroin, are prescribed 
by qualified and licensed medical professionals to 
people who are registered as dependent on drugs. 
Swiss heroin clinics are a prominent working exam-
ple of this model.
• Specialist pharmacy model – Licensed medical 
professionals serve as gatekeepers to a range of 
drugs, facilitating over-the-counter sales. Additional 
controls, such as licensing of purchasers or sales 
rations, can also be implemented. This is the model 
adopted for retail sales of cannabis in Uruguay.
• Licensed retail model – Licensed outlets sell 
lower-risk drugs in accordance with strict licensing 
conditions that can include controls on price, 
marketing, sales to minors, and mandated health 
and safety information on product packaging. Less 
restrictive examples of this model include off-
licenses, tobacconists, or front-of-counter sales in 
pharmacies.
• Licensed premises model – Similar to pubs, 
bars, or cannabis ‘coffee shops’, licensed premises 
sell lower-risk drugs for on-site consumption, sub-
ject to strict licensing conditions similar to those for 
licensed retail (above). 
• Unlicensed retail model – Drugs of sufficiently 
low risk, such as coffee or coca tea, require little or 
no licensing, with regulation needed only to ensure 
that appropriate production practices and trading 
standards are followed. 
ExAMPLES OF 
DRUG REGULATION
Many impoverished households and communities have been drawn 
into the illicit drug economy. Their needs should not be overlooked 
during the transition to legally regulated markets. Such considera-
tions should be more fully incorporated into the policy decisions of 
governments, UN agencies and non-governmental organizations. 
It is also important to acknowledge the limits of what regulation 
can achieve – it is not a panacea. Just as prohibition will never 
produce a drug-free world, regulatory models cannot be expected 
to create a risk free world. Regulating markets within a responsible 
legal framework can nevertheless dramatically reduce the harms 
associated with the illegal trade, and in the longer term, create a 
far better environment to address problematic drug use and other 
social ills. The benefits of regulation can be significant, but these 
will emerge gradually as the reform process unfolds at different 
speeds with different drugs, in different places. 
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The evolution of an effective, modern international drug 
control system requires leadership from the UN and national 
governments, building a new consensus founded on core 
principles that allows and encourages exploration of alternative 
approaches to prohibition.
3.
GLOBAL LEADERSHIP 
FOR MORE EFFECTIvE 
AND HUMANE POLICIES Drug policy is a transnational issue that requires a coordinated multidisciplinary response. Guided by its original commitments to international peace and security, human rights, and sustainable 
development, the United Nations is a critical forum for developing 
and overseeing global responses to today’s and tomorrow’s 
challenges. Change will not happen on its own. Bold and pragmatic 
leadership is needed. The paradigm shift advocated by the Global 
Commission in its reports is already helping reshape thinking on 
the direction of drug policy. What is now needed is the courage 
to ensure drug policy is fully in line with the UN’s principles from 
which it has been divorced for too long. It is time to reverse the 
direction of repressive drug policy. 
The shift of drug policy toward principles of health, security, hu-
man rights and development requires honest reflection by United 
Nations member states and agencies. It demands systematically 
reviewing the institutional and legal reforms required to bring the 
international drug control system’s original goal of securing ‘the 
health and welfare of mankind’ closer to reality. The system’s in-
ability to deliver on this goal has ultimately led to the convening 
of the 2016 UNGASS. This represents a unique opportunity for an 
open and critical review, and the exploration of ‘all options’ urged 
by the Secretary-General and world leaders. The Commission 
hopes that the recommendations issued in this report can usefully 
inform and support the process. 
As the appetite for reform gathers pace around the world, many 
new questions are emerging. For one, is the international drug 
policy regime sufficiently flexible to accommodate reforms that 
are being proposed or are already underway? What institutional 
or legal reforms at national and international level are necessary 
to make the system ‘fit for purpose’? Does today’s existing drug 
control regime adequately reflect twenty-first century realities? 
There are at least three considerations to make when tackling 
these pressing questions. 
“This [Commission on Narcotic Drugs]  
will be followed, in 2016, by the UN  
General Assembly Special Session on  
the issue. I urge Member States to use 
these opportunities to conduct a  
wide-ranging and open debate that 
considers all options.”113
Ban Ki Moon, Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, 2013
First, the international drug control regime offers some degree of 
flexibility. There are some positive reforms that can occur within the 
existing treaty framework, including ending the criminalization of 
people who use drugs and low level participants in the drug trade, 
and implementing harm reduction interventions.112 For states that 
have yet to implement such measures, the drug treaties offer no 
excuse for inaction. Indeed, UN human rights monitors have clearly 
identified that the failure to provide key harm reduction services 
constitutes a violation of the right to health.114 
Second, the concept of flexibility should not be used to justify 
or condone repressive or abusive practices that have often 
characterized drug policy over the past half century.115  While 
it is true that there are limits to what is permissible under the 
drugs conventions in terms of reform,116 it is also the case that 
there are clear constraints as to what is allowable with respect to 
international human rights law. 
The development of ‘international standards on human rights while 
countering the world drug problem’ is a necessary step forward. An 
agreement to develop such standards – which may be modeled on 
existing guidelines on how to ensure  counter-terrorism117 activities 
or business practices118 comply with human rights — should be a 
key outcome of the General Assembly Special Session process in 
2016. This will require input from UN human rights mechanisms 
and civil society in relation to applicable human rights  
standards, such as proportionate infringements of rights; fair 
trials and sentencing; the use of force; extradition; equality and 
non-discrimination; indigenous peoples’ rights, cultural rights and 
religious freedom; the rights of the child; and the right to the  
highest attainable standard of health.
CC
 B
Y-
SA
 3
.0
3534
“There is a spirit of reform in the air to 
make the [UN drug control] conventions 
fit for purpose and adapt them to a 
reality on the ground that is considerably 
different from the time they were 
drafted.”121  
Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director, 
UNODC, 2008
“The United Nations should exercise 
its leadership, as is its mandate ... and 
conduct deep reflection to analyze all 
available options, including regulatory or 
market measures, in order to establish 
a new paradigm that prevents the 
flow of resources to organized crime 
organizations.” 119
President Santos of Colombia, President 
Calderón of Mexico, President Molina of 
Guatemala, Statement to the UN General 
Assembly, 2013
A lynchpin of the current debate is cannabis policy. Reforms in 
this area – particularly those involving regulatory experiments – are 
swiftly progressing due to the widespread use of cannabis, the way 
which it is cultivated, its moderate risk profile compared to most 
other drugs, and its ongoing regulatory experimentation. 
THE ORGANIZATION OF 
AMERICAN STATES ‘PATHWAYS’ 
SCENARIO REPORT
In 2013, the Organization of American States – which is the 
main political forum for all 35 independent states of the 
Americas – produced an expert report on ‘Scenarios for the 
Drugs Problem in the Americas 2013-2025’.124 The report 
includes possible futures for global drug policy, with its  
‘Pathways’ scenario mapping out a course of events in which 
individual state challenges to the existing drug control system 
ultimately force the issue of treaty reform to be discussed at 
“The United Nations drug control bodies 
should: 
Consider creating a permanent 
mechanism, such as an independent 
commission, through which international 
human rights actors can contribute to the 
creation of international drug policy, and 
monitor national implementation, with the 
need to protect the health and human 
rights of drug users and the communities 
they live in as its primary objective...
Consider creating an alternative drug 
regulatory framework in the long term, 
based on a model such as the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control.” 123
Anand Grover, Special Rapporteur on the 
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health, 2010
Third, there are limits to the flexibility available within the existing 
system. Different states naturally face distinct challenges, and 
have varying priorities in moving forward. But any progress requires 
experimentation and innovation, and the system needs to support 
and evaluate these new approaches, rather than trying to suppress 
them. While some reforms are possible, the current regime explicitly 
prohibits experimentation with legal regulatory models, acting as a 
straightjacket on a key area of innovative policy development. 
The strength of the UN treaty system is based on the consensus 
of support from member states and the legitimacy of its goals. For 
the drug control treaties this consensus has fractured,120 and their 
legitimacy is weakening owing to their negative consequences. 
More and more states are viewing the core punitive elements of 
the drug treaties as not merely inflexible, but outdated, counterpro-
ductive and in urgent need of reform. If this growing dissent is not 
accommodated through a meaningful formal process to explore 
reform options, the drug treaty system risks becoming even more 
ineffectual and redundant, as more reform-minded member states 
unilaterally opt to distance themselves from it.
A weakened drug control system in turn jeopardizes the important 
role of a United Nations framework for regulating access to essen-
tial medicines, providing guidance, and monitoring compliance with 
recommended best practice and minimum rights standards. Rather 
than slipping into irrelevance, the ambitions of the treaties to 
regulate medical and scientific uses of drugs need to be extended 
to embrace the regulation of drugs for non-medical uses, in pursuit 
of the same set of UN goals. 
Unilateral defections from the drug treaties are undesirable from 
the perspective of international relations and a system built on 
consensus. Yet the integrity of that very system is not served in the 
long run by dogmatic adherence to an outdated and dysfunctional 
normative framework. 
The evolution of legal systems to account for changing 
circumstances is fundamental to their survival and utility, and the 
regulatory experiments being pursued by various states are acting 
as a catalyst for this process. Indeed, respect for the rule of law 
requires challenging those laws that are generating harm or that 
are ineffective. 
RECOMMENDATION 7
Take advantage of the opportunity 
presented by the upcoming UNGASS 
in 2016 to reform the global drug 
policy regime. The leadership of the UN 
Secretary-General is essential to ensure 
that all relevant UN agencies – not just 
those focused on law enforcement but 
also health, security, human rights and 
development – engage fully in a ‘One-
UN’ assessment of global drug control 
strategies. The UN Secretariat should 
urgently facilitate an open discussion 
including new ideas and recommendations 
that are grounded in scientific evidence, 
public health principles, human rights 
and development. Policy shifts towards 
harm reduction, ending criminalization of 
people who use drugs, proportionality of 
sentences and alternatives to incarceration 
have been successfully defended over 
the past decades by a growing number of 
countries on the basis of the legal latitude 
allowed under the UN treaties. Further 
exploration of flexible interpretations of the 
drug treaties is an important objective, but 
ultimately the global drug control regime 
must be reformed to permit responsible 
legal regulation. 
Although the inevitability of further cannabis reforms looks set to 
be the issue that opens the debate around a wider treaty system 
renegotiation,122 longer term questions around potential regulation 
models for other drugs must not be overlooked or sidelined. It is 
important that short-term reforms focused on cannabis are not the 
end of the story, but instead act as the catalyst for a more 
fundamental review of the international drug control system.
Member states and UN agencies have an unprecedented opportu-
nity to demonstrate leadership, using the 2016 UNGASS to initiate 
a meaningful multilateral reform process. This will require openness 
to greater flexibility for experimentation, as well as a willingness to 
reconsider the dated punitive paradigm. At an institutional level, 
the necessary realignment of the system towards the core health, 
human rights and security priorities of the UN can begin by recog-
nizing the responsibility of the WHO (and ensuring it is funded to 
fulfill its existing or expanded mandate). 
Reform can also be propelled forward with meaningful inputs from, 
and coordination with, other agencies such as UNAIDS, the United 
Nations Development Program, and the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. The UN System Task Force on 
Transnational Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking established by 
the Secretary-General could play an important role in this process 
if its focus incorporates a wider public health agenda. This task 
force, or a similar entity convened for the purpose, could also be 
given a mandate to lead a post-UNGASS process of exploring the 
options for multilateral reforms. 
the 2016 UNGASS. In this scenario the question is subject to 
a heated UNGASS debate but remains unresolved. 
The scenario then foresees a group of likeminded states 
coalescing in the post-2016 period and producing a  
‘Modernizing Drug Control’ proposal. Said proposal would call 
for greater flexibility for individual states to explore regulatory 
alternatives to prohibition, while preserving key elements of 
the existing framework (including around production, trade 
and access to essential medicines). The pressure generated 
by this reform grouping on the existing system ultimately 
results in the prohibitionist block giving way, and the 
emergence of a new, more flexible single convention on 
drugs, replacing the existing three.
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Key to designing more effective policy is the development of 
a new set of metrics with which to monitor and evaluate im-
pacts of different approaches. A first step is acknowledging 
that the overarching goal of a ‘drug-free world’ is unhelpful, 
and leads to irrational policy prescriptions. It hinders the 
debate on pragmatic responses to the reality of widespread 
drug use as it currently exists, while stifling experimenta-
tion of alternative policies. It is time to reframe the goal as 
reducing the health and social harms caused both by drug 
use, and by misguided, repressive drug policy. 
Official government and UN evaluations of drug policy are 
preoccupied with metrics such as arrests and drug seizures. 
These are process measures, reflecting the scale of enforce-
ment efforts, rather than outcome measures that tell us 
about the actual impacts of drug use and drug policies on 
people’s lives. Process measures can give the impression of 
success, when the reality for people on the ground is often 
the opposite. Numbers of drug users or the scale of the 
illicit drug market are more useful, but still imperfect, proxy 
measures for public health and community safety. 
What is urgently needed to inform the development of more 
just and effective policies is a comprehensive set of metrics 
that measure the full spectrum of drug-related health is-
sues, as well as the wider social impacts of different policy 
interventions. The UNODC has identified some of the key 
costs, or as it refers to them, ‘unintended consequences’, 
of the global drug control system, including; ‘the creation of 
a criminal black market’; the displacement of limited drug 
budgets from public health into enforcement, the ‘balloon 
effect’ (geographical displacement of illicit market activity), 
and the marginalization and stigmatization of people who 
use drugs.125
Despite having taken the important step of identifying these 
negative consequences, the UNODC has not systematically 
evaluated them, or required member states to do so. They 
may be ‘unintended’ but can no longer be seen as unantici-
pated or irrelevant. Notwithstanding some recent improve-
ments, substantive policy impact areas remain conspicu-
ously absent from the UNODC’s flagship annual World Drug 
Report. There is little mention of sophisticated measures 
of drug related health harms and drug service provision, 
human rights compliance in enforcement and treatment, 
economic impacts, and impacts of policy and illicit drug 
markets on violence, conflict, security and development. As 
it stands, the ‘official’ evaluation of global drug control, is 
therefore telling less than half of the story. 
Meanwhile, elsewhere in the UN, the role of the WHO 
in global tobacco and alcohol policy provides a useful 
template for how international drug policy evaluation 
could function better. There are also other useful models 
emerging from the UN Department of Peace-keeping 
Operations on early warning systems, UN Women on gender 
mainstreaming, and UNAIDS. 
The Global Commission also proposes that member states’ 
progress towards more effective policy frameworks could be 
assessed using a series of institutional indicators relating to 
the Commission’s core recommendations and linked to the 
establishment of minimum standards. These could include 
for example; the removal of criminal sanctions for users, 
the provision of essential medicines for pain control, the 
provision of core harm reduction services, and human rights 
monitoring of law enforcement. 
Another opportunity to reshape the drug policy reform de-
bate is the ongoing negotiation over the future content of the 
post-2015 development agenda. United Nations member 
states are reviewing possible Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) to replace the Millennium Development Goals 
agreed in 2000. At present, there are 17 Goals that focus on 
various development priorities including ending poverty and 
hunger, promoting healthy lives, ensuring quality education 
and gender equality, and making cities and settlements safer 
and achieving peaceful, inclusive and just societies.126 
If progress is to be made in future SDGs, drug-use and drug 
policy related harms must be prevented and reduced. A 
key goal for states, however, is ensuring that unachievable 
goals such as a ‘drug-free world’ are abandoned. Rather, 
their focus must be on ensuring pragmatic goals, targets 
and indicators that prioritize the safety, health and human 
rights of all people. The Global Commission looks forward to 
working with UN member states and civil societies to identify 
language that will most effectively achieve these aims.  
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While often viewed as an obscure technical issue, the challenge 
of scheduling drugs within a graded system is one of the primary 
functions of the international drug control regime. And decisions 
over the types and intensities of controls have become a flashpoint. 
There are mounting tensions and concerns associated with the 
general orientation of the drug policy regime and the functioning of 
its institutions.127
The UN drug conventions were designed to facilitate both the prohi-
bition of certain drugs for non-medical use and the legal regulation 
of many of the same (and other) drugs for medical and scientific 
uses.  Although the implementation of the conventions has histori-
cally been biased toward prohibition, there is growing awareness 
of the importance of re-balancing the system and reaffirming the 
importance of health principles.128
The asymmetric application of the conventions is reflected in the 
historic marginalization of the WHO and its treaty-mandated role 
in making recommendations on scheduling through its Expert 
Committee on Drug Dependence (ECDD). Specifically, the WHO 
has long been starved of funding and technical resources to fulfill 
its duties. Indeed, the ECDD has been compelled to restrict its 
regular meetings to six-year increments, when by custom, it should 
convene biannually. 
The lack of technical resources to undertake reviews, and the 
frequent rejection of expert recommendations considered politi-
cally unacceptable by more repressive member states, has led to 
numerous anomalies in the system. For example, the last scientific 
review to make a recommendation on cannabis occurred in 1935, 
under the previous League of Nations system. As a result, cannabis 
still sits alongside heroin in the most restrictive schedule. 
ANNEx. CLASSIFICATION OF DRUGS 
And while the scientific expertise of the WHO has been progres-
sively marginalized, other UN drug control bodies that lean towards 
more repressive positions, including the International Narcotics 
Control Board (INCB), have been reinforced. The INCB has arguably 
exceeded its mandate through increased interference in scheduling 
decisions. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) has also been 
used as a platform by repressively inclined governments to criticize 
the WHO. The CND is required to take the WHO scientific evidence 
in ‘good faith’ and already has very wide discretion to reject recom-
mendations on social, economic and other grounds.
A prominent example of the tensions between the CND and the 
ECDD is the ongoing dispute over the scheduling of ketamine. 
Ketamine is a drug that has important uses as an anesthetic and is 
included on the WHO Model List of Essential Medicines. The ECDD 
has repeatedly recommended that it not be scheduled under the 
conventions, due to concerns that it would restrict its medical  
availability, which would in turn ‘limit access to essential and 
emergency surgery’, constituting ‘a public health crisis in countries 
where no affordable alternative anesthetic is available’.  
However, owing to concerns over the non-medical use of ketamine, 
the INCB has repeatedly called for it to be scheduled, and has 
attempted to bypass the WHO recommendation by urging member 
states to put in place national controls. At the same time, state 
parties have attempted (so far unsuccessfully) to use resolutions 
at the CND to overrule the WHO, and encourage states to schedule 
ketamine at a domestic level.     
Prohibition
The establishment of criminal sanctions for the production, distri-
bution, and possession of certain drugs (for other than medical or 
scientific uses). This term is used in reference to the international 
drug control regime as defined by the UN conventions and treaties 
of 1961, 1971 and 1988, as well as domestic legislation (sanc-
tions varying widely). 
Decriminalization
Most commonly used to describe the removal or non-enforcement 
of criminal penalties for use or possession of small quantities of 
drugs or paraphernalia for personal use (sometimes also used in 
reference to other minor drug offences). While no longer criminal, 
possession still remains an offence subject to administrative or 
civil sanctions, such as fines or referrals to services. 
Legalization
The process of ending prohibitions on the production, distribution 
and use of a drug for other than medical or scientific uses. In the 
drug policy context ‘Legalization’ is generally used to refer to a 
policy position advocating ‘legal regulation’ or ‘legally regulated 
drug markets’ for currently prohibited drugs.   
Regulation
The set of legally enforceable rules that govern the market for a 
drug, involving application of different controls depending on drug 
risks and needs of local environments. Includes regulation of pro-
duction (licensed producers), products (price, potency, packaging), 
availability (licensed vendors, location of outlets, age controls), and 
marketing (advertising and branding).     
Harm reduction
‘Harm reduction’ refers to policies, programs, and practices that 
aim to mitigate the negative health, social, and economic con-
sequences of using legal and illegal psychoactive drugs, without 
necessarily reducing drug use. 
Novel/New Psychoactive Substances (NPS)
Generally (although not exclusively) this term is used to describe 
recently emerging synthetically produced drugs used for nonmedi-
cal or scientific purposes, not subject to control under the United 
Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961 and the United 
Nations Convention on Psychotropic Drugs 1971 (although some 
Nation States may act unilaterally and regulate or prohibit certain 
NPS under domestic legislation).
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www.cupihd.org
Drug Policy Alliance
www.drugpolicy.org
European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug Addiction
www.emcdda.europa.eu
Global Commission on Drug Policy
www.globalcommissionondrugs.org
Global Commission on HIV and the Law (convened by UNDP)
www.hivlawcommission.org/
Harm Reduction International
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www.igarape.org.br 
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International Drug Policy Consortium
www.idpc.net
International Network of People who use Drugs
www.inpud.net
LSE Ideas; International drug policy project
www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/projects/idpp/
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Transform Drug Policy Foundation
www.tdpf.org.uk
 
Transnational Institute; drug law reform resources
www.druglawreform.info/
The Beckley Foundation
www.beckleyfoundation.org
UN Office on Drugs and Crime
www.unodc.org 
Washington Office on Latin America - Drug Policy program
www.wola.org/program/drug_policy
 
West Africa Commission on Drugs
www.wacommissionondrugs.org/
PUBLICATIONS
Reports by the Global Commission on Drug Policy:
• War on Drugs - 2011
• The War on Drugs and HIV/AIDS: How The Criminalization  
Of Drug Use Fuels The Global Pandemic - 2012
• The Negative Impact of the War on Drugs: The Hidden  
Hepatitis C Epidemic - 2013 
www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/reports/
HIV and the Law: Risks, Rights And Health - Global Commission  
on HIV and the Law - 2012
www.hivlawcommission.org/index.php/report
 
The Drug Problem in the Americas - Organization of American 
States - 2013
www.cicad.oas.org/Main/Template.asp?File=/drogas/elinforme/
default_eng.asp
Ending the Drug Wars – London School of Economics - 2014
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GLOBAL COMMISSION 
ON DRUG POLICY
THE PURPOSE OF THE GLOBAL COMMISSION 
ON DRUG POLICY IS TO BRING TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
LEvEL AN INFORMED, SCIENCE BASED DISCUSSION 
ABOUT HUMANE AND EFFECTIvE WAYS TO REDUCE 
THE HARM CAUSED BY DRUGS TO PEOPLE 
AND SOCIETIES.
GOALS
· Review the basic assumptions, effectiveness 
and consequences of the ‘war on drugs’ 
approach 
· Evaluate the risks and benefits of different 
national responses to the drug problem
· Develop actionable, evidence-based 
recommendations for constructive legal  
and policy reform
CONTACT
secretariat@globalcommissionondrugs.org
